

Security in Agile Development

So, you're telling me it can be agile and secure?



Who am I?

Daniel Schwarz


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



- appropriate steps to ensure information security -

Good ol Waterfall times



Good ol' Waterfall times




Let's get agile



<https://bitbytesoft.com/phases-of-agile-software-development-life-cycle/>

Let's get agile




Pentest in every sprint?



- Within a year of Amazon's move to AWS, engineers were deploying code every 11.7 seconds, on average. -

<https://techbeacon.com/app-dev-testing/10-companies-killing-it-devops>



Multiple pentests in every sprint?






Automation
of most security
verifications





Know-How
with great power
comes great
responsibility

Standardization
for automatic
quality gate
enforcement










Threat Modeling



Identify things that can go wrong in your system and prevent them



Initial Threat Model 

Derive Threats for Current Task 

Extend Threat Model 

Architecture Changes


Reoccurring Problems / Vulnerabilities



Threat Modeling

1 What are we building?

- Identify your sensitive data
- Create a diagram together



little example:

- We're creating a pizza order system
- Customers can save
 - their address
 - their personal pizza configurations
 - their credit card
- Payment is done via an external payment-provider

Sensitive Data

credit card data

usernames

passwords

pizza prices

pizza configurations

....



Threat Modeling

1 What are we building?

- Identify your sensitive data
- Create a diagram together

2 What can go wrong?

- Brainstorm Worst-Case scenarios
- Use STRIDE as a checklist for major categories

Worst Case Szenarios	
Spoofing	Login as another customer and order a free pizza
Tampering	Competitor increases pizza prices; Customer modifies pizza prices to 0 €
Repudiation	Somebody orders a pizza and afterwards says he didn't
Information Disclosure	Credit Card data gets leaked
Denial of Service	Nobody can order pizza
Elevation of Privileges	Somebody can get admin privileges



Threat Modeling



Application Security Verification Standard 4.0

1 What are we building?

- Identify your sensitive data
- Create a diagram together

2 What can go wrong?

- Brainstorm Worst-Case scenarios
- Use STRIDE as a checklist for major categories

3 What can we do about it?

- Use OWASP ASVS to derive requirements

2.1.1	Verify that user set passwords are at least 12 characters in length.
2.2.1	Verify that anti-automation controls are effective [...] controls include blocking the most common breached passwords, soft lockouts , rate limiting, CAPTCHA, ever increasing delays between attempts [...]
2.2.4	Verify impersonation resistance against phishing, such as the use of multi-factor authentication [...]
9.1.1	Verify that secured TLS is used for all client connectivity, and does not fall back to insecure or unencrypted protocols.
...	...



Using ChatGPT as a Threat Model „Expert“

- Give it a lot of details for your initial threat model
- Shape the prompt according to best practices
 - e.g.: <https://danielmiessler.com/p/response-shaping-how-to-move-from-ai-prompts-to-ai-whispering/>
 - Tell the system who to behave as
 - Tell the system what format it produces
 - Give it the main task you want done
 - ...
- Explain your current task for the ongoing threat model



The initial Threat Model

DA

You

Hi,
please act as a cyber security professional who is a master in threat modeling.
Your job is to create a threat model for the following system:

We plan to build an online pizza order system. Customers can save their address, their personal preferred pizza configurations and their credit card data.

Of course the system also needs to save all the different available pizzas and their current prices. And for user logins it will save usernames and passwords.

There are three types of users:

- 1) anonymous users, who can only view public content like our pizza menu
- 2) authenticated customers, who can update their profile, configure pizzas and order these pizzas.
- 3) authenticated admins, who can update the pizza prizes

The whole system runs in containers in AWS. Data is stored in a PostgreSQL database. The frontend is a React SPA which communicates with a JSON REST API written in Python.

The authentication and session management is done via JWTs

The payment of the pizza orders is done via an external payment provider.
The communication with the external payment provider will be done via a REST API.

Please create a threat model for this system.

It should contain 4 chapters:

1) Management Summary

This should be a short management summary to give an overview of the system.

2) Worst-Case Szenarios

This chapter should list a few worst-case szenarios the system faces and their potential business impact. There should be at least one realistic worst-case szenario for each STRIDE category.

3) Identified Threats

This is the main chapter which contains all possible identified threats and potential vulnerabilities (at least 10) in an extensive markdown table. The table should have the following columns: ID, Title, Threat Scenario, Potential Vulnerability, Impact, Risk, Countermeasures, ASVS-Requirements.

The column ASVS-Requirements should contain the IDs of the OWASP ASVS-Requirements relevant to the respective finding.

4) Countermeasure details

This chapter contains a detailed description of the countermeasures. It explains the benefits the countermeasure brings. Wherever possible please include code or configuration examples, but also describe what exactly these examples are doing.




The ongoing Threat Model

DA **You**

We would like to extend our system for a function to share pizza configurations with other users. So it should be possible for a user to create a link to a specific pizza configuration he defined, share this link with a friend and this friend should be able to add this configuration to his private profile.

Do you see any threats we should consider here?



Threat Model 

 Secure Coding Guides 

Pentest


Training 

Security Champion 

Secure Coding Guidelines



Checklist to ensure secure coding best practices



Initial
Sec Coding
Guide



Derive from Company- or
Generic Standard

Get Expert Help


Use Threat Model as Input



Secure Coding Guidelines



Checklist to ensure secure coding best practices



Initial Sec Coding Guide



Select relevant Chapters as Checklist




Extend Sec Coding Guide




Architecture Changes


Reoccurring Problems / Vulnerabilities






Security Verifications







Key Messages

- 1 Security is more important than ever**
We also need to consider it in short release cycles
- 2 Automate (most) security tests and make them mandatory by pipelines**
Smart combination of tools and manual pentests is most efficient
- 3 Start threat modeling and utilize AI**
A little brainstorming for worst-case szenarios already gives you a good starting point
- 4 Use secure coding guidelines as checklists**
Its hard to remember everything – checklists are great!



Resources

- Diagrams
 - Data Flow Diagrams (DFD): <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/learn/modules/tm-introduction-to-threat-modeling/2-step-1-design-phase>
 - C4 Model: <https://c4model.com/>
- Secure Design
 - 8 Security Design Principles: <https://www.cs.virginia.edu/~evans/cs551/saltzer/>
 - IEEE CSD: <https://cybersecurity.ieee.org/center-for-secure-design/>
- Threat Modeling Methods
 - STRIDE: <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2007/09/11/stride-chart/>
 - OCTAVE: <https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=13473>
 - TRIKE: <http://www.octotrike.org/>
 - PASTA: https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/AppSecEU2012_PASTA.pdf
 - LINDDUN: <https://www.linddun.org>
 - ATASM: https://published-prd.lanyonevents.com/published/rsaus18/sessionsFiles/9225/LAB3-R02_Threat-Models-Into-The-Deep.pdf
 - Attack Trees: https://www.schneier.com/academic/archives/1999/12/attack_trees.html
- Starting Points for Secure Coding Guides
 - OWASP ASVS: <https://owasp.org/www-project-application-security-verification-standard/>
 - OWASP Top 10: <https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>
- AI Prompt Shaping
 - <https://danielmiessler.com/p/response-shaping-how-to-move-from-ai-prompts-to-ai-whispering/>



condignum

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